In many advertising-intensive industries one observes market share persistence, i.e., firms maintaining lead market shares over long periods of time. I hypothesize that firms that have the largest stock of well-established brands, a stock that I term brand capital, are most likely to introduce new products in response to new market information about consumer preferences. Firms with less brand capital delay their introductions until the uncertainty concerning the market size is reduced. I present empirical support in a study of new product introductions in the U.S. beverage industry.
I. Introduction
H OW is it that some firms are able consistently to outperform competitors in profitability and market share? Given that consumer tastes and technologies evolve over time, one potential source of persistent advantage is the ability to be first to market new products successfully. While a relationship has been documented between the order of entering new markets and the share subsequently sustained, there is little understanding of which firms first offer new products. Robinson and Fornell (1985) , who found persistent share advantage among first entries in a sample of 371 mature consumer goods businesses, attribute this phenomenon partly to Schmalensee's (1982) theoretical finding that later entering brands are at a disadvantage when consumers are uncertain about the quality of new products. A subsequent study by Urban et al. (1986) found that order of entry explained a significant amount of the variation in market share for a sample of 47 new brands across twelve product categories.
There is some evidence which suggests that the ability to maintain share leadership is much stronger in advertising intensive industries than others. According to AdvertisingAge, of the top twenty-five consumer brands that were sold in 1923, nineteen were still share leaders in 1983.
Four brands fell to number two position, one to number three, and one to fifth. ' Sutton (1991) finds evidence that the endogeneity of advertising expenditures places a lower bound on concentration in the food and drink group. I wish to develop the idea that there exists a firm-specific asset, which I term brand capital, that rests in goodwill accrued by the firm's existing brands. This goodwill explains why firms with high values of brand capital are most likely to introduce new products first, those with less brand capital wait and enter only if the market size is sufficiently large.
As markets for new product varieties arise or are perceived, some are large and can accommodate many entrants; small new markets can accommodate only a few. I will show that firms with high levels of brand capital introduce products in both large and small new markets, those with low levels of brand capital only in large markets.
Thus, the high brand capital firm can maintain a higher share than its low brand capital rivals even as consumer tastes change. This offers a possible explanation for the share persistence phenomenon in advertising-intensive industries.
There has been some work on brand-related goodwill in the economics literature. Wernerfelt and Sappington (1985) developed a model whereby two firms that have a brand image in one market introduce a new product along a linear city. In addition to the traditional transportation cost, each consumer faces an image cost. The further away the new product is from the original brand's image, the more uncertain the consumer is of the new brand's quality. Thus, firms have an incentive to introduce new brands "close" to the image of the original product. The authors also present some evidence that suggests that the further away a firm places a new brand from the original, the less likely it is to use the name of the original brand. Wernerfelt (1988) shows that brand names can be used as a signal of high quality. Raubitschek (1988) develops a model in which firms introduce more products as the probability of product success increases. The concept of brand capital suggests that firms with more brand capital will not only introduce more products but BRAND CAPITAL AND INCUMBENT FIRMS' POSITIONS 523 also introduce early. Schmalensee (1978) develops a model where existing firms introduce new brands in order to limit outside entry. While brand capital does not deal with entry deterrence, it does explain the entry order of new incumbent brands.
In this paper, I show that in the beer, soft drink, and coffee industries, the firms most likely to enter new products first in response to new information about consumer tastes are those with the most brand capital. of pioneering brands as in Schmalensee (1982) .
Consumers discount the utility from brands which they have not tried. The size of this discount decreases with the closeness of the new brand to the same firm's existing brand which the consumer has either tried or gained word-of-mouth recommendations. The consumer's lowered discount can be justified on the ground that the firm would not find it profitable to deliberately introduce a bad brand for fear of destroying goodwill on its existing brand.
Each firm can introduce a new brand which is associated or identified with one of its existing brands. This association can be accomplished through what is known in marketing parlance as a brand extension: a new product which uses the brand name of an existing brand. For reasons discussed above, consumers are more likely to try new products which bear familiar brand names because they believe that such products are more likely to deliver the promised attributes.3 Because firm A has more existing brands than firm B by assumption, one of its brands is likely the nearest on the circle to some point about which the firms receive new information (equally likely to come from any point on the circle). From these assumptions the following testable behavioral hypotheses follow.
i) The firm with the largest stock of existing brands (i.e., the firm's brand capital) expects to sell more units in any uncertain new market, so will enter some markets that other firms would skip as exceptionally unprofitable. Revealed market size will sometimes be larger than mean expectation, causing the subsequent entry by low capital firms. Thus the high-capital firm is the most likely first entrant.
ii) A low capital firm may enter first if the expected market size is large enough, but the probability that the high-capital firm enters second conditional on the lowcapital firm having entered first is greater than the probability that the low capital firm enters second conditional on the high capital firm entering first.
iii) A market with large expected size is both more likely to be roomy enough to attract a low capital first entrant and more likely to be profitable for multiple entrants.
Throughout the discussion I have ignored price competition. To justify this assumption one can invoke models of vertical product differentiation, in which products of equal quality enter the market at the same price. Such a model seems consistent with the pricing practice in the brewing, soft drink, and coffee industries. High quality products such as premium beer and coffee carry simi-2 I assume that firm A disperses its brands.
3There is some theoretical and empirical support for this pattern of buying behavior. Aaker and Keller (1990) measured how consumers form attitudes towards brand extensions and found that consumer valuations were higher the closer the "fit" between the original brand and the extension. observable I define a latent variable yip, which is firm i's propensity to enter at position p. I will estimate yip using a rank ordered logit technique as described in Hausman and Ruud (1987) . Let Yip be given by the following expression:
Yip= qip -yF + Eip p= 1,...,P.
,3 is a P-vector of weights on unit sales and y is The maximum likelihood estimate is the maximizer of L( /, y).
IV. Variables and Defilnitions

A. Brand Capital
In order to estimate the model I need proxies for qip and yip. The earlier discussion suggests that the quantity a firm sells is a function of the distance of its nearest brand from the location of its new product. The more established brands the firm has, the shorter this distance is likely to be.
Thus the number of units that the firm expects to sell is proportional to its number of well-established brands, which I will thus use as a proxy-for qip. Henceforth I will refer to the number of well-established brands as the firm's "brand capital" and to established brands as "capital brands."
Previous studies of consumer package goods industries, e.g., Raubitschek (1988) , suggest that a brand is well established if it has survived for at least five years on the market. As the products examined in my study exhibit similar frequencies 4As long as consumers choose product largely by brand name and not price there is no efficiency or business stealing effect. The introduction of a new nearby product does not force the firm to lower the price of its existing products. This is consistent with the highly inelastic demand of products in the food and drink group. As long as the updated market size is large enough to accommodate a new product, no incumbent can delay a new product from entering by choosing not to introduce itself. In particular, in a two period game, there exists no Nash equilibrium where the incumbent chooses to delay introduction in period one in order to preserve profits from his existing product line. The entrant would choose to enter during period one. Given this, the incumbent would earn greater profits by introducing during period one. Thus there is no disincentive to introduce due to a replacement or cannibalization effect. of purchase, I employ this same rule. A brand introduced in year t and still offered in years t + 1, . . ., t + 5 is thus a capital brand.
B. Order of Entry
The model defines a round of new product introductions as a sequence of brands of a new product introduced by incumbent firms. The order of entry was determined for each round on the basis of the date each brand was nationally introduced, the brand with the earliest date being first, the one with the next earliest being second, and so forth. The actual order of entry will be used as a proxy for Yip in the following fashion. Second, advertisers deliberately target their products to different groups of potential buyers using different media, so that consumers obtain the most information on the brands within a segment.
I argue that this pattern suggests four segments in the beer industry. Popular beers are priced lowest and targeted at large-volume consumers, premium beers are priced in the mid-range, super premium beers are priced highest and targeted at upscale drinkers who also consume expensive imported beers, and malt, which is higher than others in alcohol content, is targeted at college students and ethnic drinkers. Elzinga (1986) supports this segmentation. He finds beer drinking to be highly image conscious and price elasticity to be very high within segments, but low between them. The soft drink industry is segmented by product type, of which I identified four: colas; lemon-lime; root beer; and orange. Consumers can easily discern that these products are physically different. Manufacturers of lemon-lime soft drinks typically address their advertising to consumers who do not like colas. While each of these segments might be further divided (e.g., diet colas or diet lemon-lime), the prevalence of common brand names suggests that products in these subsegments are selected on the basis of a common set of goodwill assets and brand names. Thus, for purposes of testing the hypotheses I do not see a need to treat these as separate segments. I identified two segments in the coffee industry: instant and regular. These two product types are very different, not only in taste, but also in terms of production process, production of instant coffee being much more capital-intensive. In addition, since manufacturers also advertise regular coffee as the higher quality product, this would suggest an element of vertical integration. Malt Beverage aThe La Croix brand name was used in the sparkling cooler segment as a non-malt cooler. bStroh acquired the Barbican brand name from a U.K. brewer which sold the product in the U.S. c Indirect affiliation means that the corporate name was extensively used in the introduction. In this case the Anheuser-Busch name was extensively used to promote products. dHeilemann has extended the Black Label line to regular, light, low-alcohol, and malt. not enter first, it is next most likely to enter second, and if not second then third. Equivalently, given that the firm with the highest capital enters first, the firm with the next highest capital is most likely to enter second than in any other position. The firm with the next highest capital is then more likely to enter third than in any other position. This result is also consistent with the maintained hypothesis.
The results for the soft drink industry conform to the hypothesis only in part. The greater the capital the more likely a firm is to enter in the first position rather than any other position. The coefficients for later entries, however, are higher than they are for the first. In the soft drink industry, the firm that has the largest share of capital brands introduced first only 43% of the time. Much of the nonconformance occurs in the cola segment, in which Royal Crown stands out as a very innovative firm, being first with a diet soft drink, and first with caffeine-free diet and saltfree drinks. In addition, it does not appear that these new products emerged nearer Royal Crown's products than Coke's or Pepsi's. Thus Royal Crown's strategy is not explained by the hypothesis.7
The slope coefficients for the coffee industry are positive and significant, and their magnitudes decline with entry position. The results are consistent with the first hypothesis, although the difference between the first and second entry coefficients is small. Finally, I combine the data for a pooled estimation. The coefficients for the first, second, third, and fourth entry positions are positive and significant. In addition, the magnitude of the coefficients are suggested by the hypothesis.
It is possible that the IIA assumption does not hold. This would be true if firms decided on later entry by means of a different decision process not 7Whatever Royal Crown's strategy it has not improved its performance. Its market share has declined from nearly 7% of the cola market in the early 1970s to just over 2% in 1990. Constant -1.91a -2.56a -4.13a -3.81a -5.21 -5.21a 
B. Conditional Entry Order
The preceding tests address the first hypothesis: the high brand capital firm is most likely to enter first. While the results are consistent with it, they are also consistent with a number of other hypotheses. In particular, any firm-specific asset that is correlated with brand capital (e.g., market share or distribution costs) could yield the same result. The key feature that will distinguish my hypothesis from these alternatives is that the latter imply that the firms always enter in the same order with some stochastic error, while the for- size, then the number of entrants can be used as a proxy for expected size.
Returning to the econometric specification, I
now estimate the probability that firm i enters in position P instead of positions 1,. . . To assess this result's robustness I used another proxy for expected market size, the first-year advertising expenditures for the product that led a In this case I estimated the same model as described above but H is now equal to one if the first year advertising expense of the product leading the round is greater than the mean and zero otherwise. As before, from the above expression a likelihood function can be determined and MLE found for the 83 's and y. The results are reported in table 8. In the pooled data set the coefficients for the first, second, third, and fourth entry positions are significantly larger for the high expected size markets than the low. This means that a low capital firm is more likely to enter first, the larger is the market's expected size.
The model is also estimated for each of the three industries separately using its own median first-year advertising expenditure. In the beer industry one finds that for all but the seventh entry position firms have a greater probability of entering the larger is the expected market size. In the coffee industry one finds this resuilt for the first, Constant -2.09a -2.23a -2.84a -4.07a -3.76a -5.66a _5.02a In the beer and coffee industries, the firm with the higher share of capital brands is most likely to enter first with a new product in response to new information. Moreover, in the beer industry, the firm that enters second has a higher share of capital brands than those that enter later. In the coffee industry,, firms that enter first, second or third have more high capital brands than those that enter later. These results offer some support for the brand capital hypotheses. Results from the soft drink industry offer somewhat less support. In the soft drink industry, the firm with the highest share of capital brands was not the most likely to enter first. This is largely due to the unexplained strategy of one firm, Royal Crown.
This strategy has not improved the firm's performance.
